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Answers to frequently asked questions about this article:
Q1. Why did you adopt the Chernobyl accident as a source of radioactivity in
your model?
Chernobyl is the only INES 7 accident for which consensus exists about the emis-
sions. The source estimate is consistent among diﬀerent types of studies and with the 5
available observations. We only used
131I and
137Cs sources from Chernobyl, as these
isotopes are typically emitted from any type of nuclear reactor after a major accident.
For the other reactors accounted for in our global model the emissions were scaled by
their gross capacity to account for the diﬀerent amounts of nuclear fuel.
Q2. Why didn’t you adopt Fukushima as a source of radioactivity in your model? 10
The emissions from Fukushima are associated with much larger uncertainty than those
of Chernobyl. Table 1 in our article presents a range of emissions based on the two ref-
erences available at the time of publication, Chino et al. (2011) and Stohl et al. (2012).
If the Fukushima emissions per reactor would be a factor of ten less than of Chernobyl,
and if they would also be more representative for major accidents than Chernobyl, the 15
calculated risk of contamination would decrease proportionally by a factor of ten.
Q3. Why were only Chernobyl and Fukushima considered in the estimate of the
number of major accidents, and not less severe accidents such as Three Mile
Island?
We concentrate on INES 7 events associated with the major release of radioactive 20
material, which are by deﬁnition “major accidents” (INES is the International Nuclear
Event Scale). Although the other accidents also released radioactivity, the amounts
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were much smaller (see Table 1 in our article). By leaving them out, we arrive at a
more conservative estimate.
Q4. How is “contaminated” by radioactivity deﬁned?
We adopt the deposition of ≥40kBqm
−2 as contaminated, following the deﬁnition given
by the IAEA (2005). Note that this refers to deposition on the ground, not radiation 5
doses (expressed in Sv). We applied the ≥40kBqm
−2 only to the deposition of
137Cs,
following the literature. However, IAEA (2005) deﬁnes contamination based on this
threshold for all gamma and beta radiating substances. Thus this is a discrepancy in
the literature that needs to be resolved. If we would apply this deﬁnition of IAEA (2005)
strictly, we would have to add the deposition of substances such as
131I and
134Cs, 10
which would increase the calculated risk of contamination accordingly.
Q5. Did you assume that emissions take place at the surface only?
In the model we emit the radioactive substances by introducing them into the surface
layer of about 60m depth. We assume that
131I and
137Cs are released gradually and
not explosively or by large ﬁres, which would increase the emission height. This as- 15
sumption leads to a conservative estimate of long-distance transport. In general, the
sensitivity to this assumption for the daytime convective boundary layer is small, but for
the stable nighttime boundary layer this can be diﬀerent.
Q6. Did you use information from non-peer reviewed publications in your model
calculations? 20
We have used the list of reactors worldwide from Wikipedia, as referenced in our ar-
ticle. We have not yet been made aware of speciﬁc errors in this listing. From this list
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we only use two simple parameters, the geographical location and the gross capac-
ity of the reactors, documented in the electronic Supplement. The source strength of
radioactivity applied in our model calculations is based on peer-reviewed publications
(about Chernobyl), including reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Q7. Have risk assessments associated with major nuclear accidents been 5
performed previously?
Yes, in diﬀerent forms:
a. In 1990 the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC, 1990) reported on the risk of
severe nuclear accidents in the USA, associated with reactor core melts (we as-
sume that “severe accident” qualiﬁes as INES 7; the International Nuclear Event 10
Scale was introduced later). The following was mentioned: “Of the plants analyzed
thus far, most have an estimated likelihood of core melt of between 1 in 10000
and 1 in 100000 per plant year” (NRC, 1990). In the appendix of NRC (1990),
which presents the overall risk estimate, only the number of 1 in 10000 is in-
cluded, being a factor of two larger than the previous estimate by the NRC (1975) 15
of 1 in 20000, and a factor of two smaller than our current estimate (1 in 5000).
The conclusions of the NRC have had important inﬂuence worldwide on deci-
sions to approve nuclear reactor technology. In Germany the National Risk Study
on Nuclear Power Plants Phase A (GfR, 1980) and Phase B (GfR, 1990) adopted
the basic methodology of the NRC and presented similar conclusions about the 20
expected incidence of core melts.
b. There are published studies available that present methodologies to perform prob-
abilistic risk assessments of contamination by selected nuclear reactor accidents
(e.g., Baklanov and Mahura, 2004). However, none addresses the combined risk
of multiple reactors worldwide. 25
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Q8. How do your probability calculations compare with previous work?
a. The appendix of NRC (1990) presents the probability of a core melt of 1 in 10000
per year, and the probability of containment failure 1 in 100. Based on the four
INES 7 events that have actually occurred until 2011, we deduce a frequency of
approximately 1 in 5000 per year, which we adopt as the statistically expected 5
value. There are more sophisticated techniques that can be applied to address
this, such as that applied by the NRC (1990), which arrived at an estimate of 1
in 10000. This is only a factor of two diﬀerent from our estimate of 1 in 5000. If
we were to redo our calculations instead using the value directly from the NRC
report, our results would decrease by a uniform factor of two everywhere in the 10
deposition intensity and the risk of contamination. A study by G¨ unther et al. (2011)
estimates the probability of a core meltdown caused by a terrorist act to be 1 in
1000 per year (in Germany). If we were to apply this estimate uniformly (thus
not even accounting for other risks) the calculated risk of contamination would
increase by a factor of ﬁve. 15
b. The NRC (1990) also made further assumptions, such as the probability of con-
tainment being 99%, which has not been borne out historically. In fact, the prob-
ability estimate of a major release of radioactivity by NRC (1990), being a combi-
nation of 1 in 10000 and the 1 in 100 probability of containment, is 1 in 1000000.
This is 200 times lower than our estimate of 1 in 5000. NRC (1990) furthermore 20
assumed a 90% probability for winds being in a “favorable direction” for evacu-
ation, and a 90% probability of not having an inversion layer, neither of which
applies to our analysis of the overall deposition and the risk of contamination,
which we integrate globally in all directions. Finally, NRC (1990) assumed a 10%
probability of evacuation failure, which is not relevant for computing the risk of 25
ground contamination.
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Q9. Are the factors leading to nuclear reactor accidents independent?
As mentioned in our article, these factors are not necessarily independent, though
this was not considered by NRC (1990). For our calculations we consider the three
core melts in Fukushima as independent because the reactor safety provisions must
be independent. A common cause such as a tsunami or a terrorist act could as well 5
aﬀect reactors farther apart from each other, even in diﬀerent countries. Nevertheless,
if one chooses to treat Fukushima as one event, this would reduce the calculated risk
of contamination by a factor of two.
Q10. Why are the model calculations performed over an entire year, considering
that major accidents typically release radioactivity over a much shorter period? 10
By integrating the model calculated deposition over a year we capture the total
contamination by
137Cs over the range of meteorological conditions that might be
encountered by an accidental release, which could occur at any time during the year.
In reality the emission and deposition occur over a much shorter period. Based on
sensitivity simulations we ﬁnd that the accumulated risk of contamination over longer 15
time periods (e.g., a year) is nearly the same as the average of the deposition that
occurs when emissions take place only over one week, for all 52 weeks of the year.
Thus, we can reduce our model simulation time by a factor of 52, which allows us to
reasonably consider the entire set of currently active nuclear reactors worldwide.
20
The service charges for this open access publication
have been covered by the Max Planck Society.
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